Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties such as secrecy or authentication. In contrast, there are very few results for equivalence-based properties, crucial for studying, for example, privacy-like properties such as anonymity or vote secrecy.
INTRODUCTION
Formal methods have been successfully applied for rigorously analyzing security protocols. In particular, many algorithms and tools (Rusinowitch and Turuani [2003] , Blanchet [2001] , Comon-Lundh and Cortier [2003] , Basin et al. [2005] , and Cremers [2008] , to cite a few) have been designed to automatically find flaws in protocols or prove
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Studying indistinguishability properties for security protocols amounts to checking a behavioral equivalence between processes. Processes represent protocols and are specified in some process algebras such as CSP or pi-calculus, except that messages are no longer atomic actions but terms, in order to faithfully represent cryptographic messages. Of course, considering terms instead of atomic actions considerably increases the difficulty of checking equivalence. As a matter of fact, there are just a few results for checking equivalence of processes that manipulate terms.
-Based on a procedure developed in Baudet [2005] , it has been shown that trace equivalence is decidable for deterministic processes with no else branches and for the family of convergent subterm equational theories [Cortier and Delaune 2009] . Convergent subterm theories capture most standard primitives including asymmetric and symmetric encryption, hashes, signatures, and macs. A simplified proof of Baudet [2005] has been proposed by Chevalier and Rusinowitch [2012] . -Tiu and Dawson [2010] have designed and implemented a procedure for open bisimulation, a notion of equivalence stronger than the standard notion of trace equivalence. This procedure only works for a limited class of processes without else branches and for symmetric encryption and pairs only. -Cheval et al. [2011] have proposed and implemented a procedure for trace equivalence and for a quite general class of processes that use standard primitives (symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hashes, signatures, pairs). In particular, this is the only decidability result that can consider nondeterministic processes and else branches.
However, these decidability results analyze equivalence for a bounded number of sessions only, that is, assuming that protocols are executed a limited number of times. This is of course a strong limitation. Even if no flaw is found when a protocol is executed n times, there is absolutely no guarantee that the protocol remains secure when it is executed n + 1 times. And actually, the existing tools for a bounded number of sessions can only analyze protocols for a very limited number of sessions, typically two or three. Another approach consists of implementing a procedure that is not guaranteed to terminate. This is in particular the case of ProVerif [Blanchet 2001 ], a well-established tool for checking security of protocols. ProVerif is able to check equivalence, although it does not always succeed [Blanchet et al. 2005] . It can check equivalence of biprocesses, that is, of two processes that have the same structure. ProVerif has been recently extended [Cheval and Blanchet 2013 ] to handle more processes, in particular with else branches, but it still cannot consider processes with very different structures. Of course, ProVerif does not correspond to any decidability result.
Our contribution. We study the decidability of equivalence of security protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Even in the case of reachability properties such as secrecy, the problem is undecidable in general. In the past, several decidable fragments and semidecision procedures have been proposed for secrecy and authentication for an unbounded number of sessions. Our goal is to obtain analogous results in the case of equivalence properties. We therefore focus on a class of protocols for which secrecy is decidable [Comon-Lundh and Cortier 2003 ]. This class, called ping-pong protocols, typically assumes that each protocol rule manipulates at most one variable and that the protocol is formed from a set of independent in/out rules. Intuitively, this corresponds to the assumption that, at each step of the protocol, upon receiving a message, there is at most one part of it that is unknown to the agent (typically a key, a nonce, or an encrypted packet).
Surprisingly, while this class is decidable for reachability, even a fragment of it (with only symmetric encryption) turns out to be undecidable for equivalence properties. We consequently further assume our protocols to be deterministic (i.e., given an input, there is at most one possible output). We show that equivalence is decidable for an unbounded number of sessions and for protocols with randomized symmetric and asymmetric encryption and with signatures. Since we need to assume that our constructors are randomized and since we assume "at most one variable," we can only handle a very limited notion of (randomized) concatenation that appends atomic values.
Interestingly, we show that checking for equivalence of protocols actually amounts to checking equality of languages of deterministic pushdown automata. The langage equivalence problem for deterministic pushdown automata is a difficult problem, shown to be decidable at ICALP in 1997 [Sénizergues 1997 ]. We actually characterize equivalence of protocols in terms of equivalence of deterministic generalized real-time pushdown automata, that is, deterministic pushdown automata with no epsilon-transition but such that the automata may unstack several symbols at a time. More precisely, we show how to associate to a process P an automata A P such that two processes are equivalent if and only if their corresponding automata yield the same language, and reciprocally, we show how to associate to an automata A a process P A such that two automata yield the same language if and only if their corresponding processes are equivalent, that is:
Therefore, checking for equivalence of protocols is as difficult as checking for equivalence of deterministic generalized real-time pushdown automata.
To transform equivalence of processes into equivalence of pushdown automata, we first show how to get rid of an active attacker. More precisely, we show that
where ≈ fwd intuitively represents equivalence of processes when the attacker may only forward messages. This equivalence is obtained by partially encoding the attacker in P and Q , still preserving equivalence.
The decision procedure for checking equivalence of deterministic pushdown automata has been recently implemented by Henry and Sénizergues [2013] . We have therefore implemented our transformation from processes to pushdown automata, yielding the first tool that decides equivalence of (some class of) protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. As an application, we have analyzed several protocols of the literature, including a simplified version of the basic access control protocol (BAC) of the biometric passport [ICAO 2008] .
We introduce the process algebra and its semantics in Section 2. We characterize the notion of ping-pong protocols and state our main results in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to decidability. More precisely, we show in Section 4 how to get rid of an active attacker by encoding it directly in the process. Next, we show in Section 5 how to encode equivalence between processes (in the presence of a forwarder attacker) into equivalence of pushdown automata, characterizing further which cases may result in nonequivalence. Finally, we study in Section 6 the converse translation and show that equivalence of pushdown automata can be reduced to equivalence of protocols. We present our implementation and its application to protocols in Section 7. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 8.
MODEL FOR SECURITY PROTOCOLS
Security protocols are modeled through a process algebra that manipulates terms. We first give the syntax of our calculus in Section 2.1, before describing its semantics in Section 2.2. Then, in Section 2.3, we define the notion of equivalence of processes.
Syntax
Term Algebra. As usual, messages are represented by terms. More specifically, we consider a sorted signature with six sorts, rand, key, msg, SymKey, PrivKey, and PubKey, that represent, respectively, random numbers, keys, messages, symmetric keys, private keys, and public keys. We assume that msg subsumes the five other sorts, and key subsumes SymKey, PrivKey, and PubKey. We consider six function symbols, senc and sdec, aenc and adec, and sign and check, that represent symmetric, asymmetric encryption, and decryption as well as signatures. Since we are interested in the analysis of indistinguishability properties, we consider a randomized encryption scheme:
senc : msg × SymKey × rand → msg sdec : msg × SymKey → msg aenc : msg × PubKey × rand → msg adec : msg × PrivKey → msg sign : msg × PrivKey × rand → msg check : msg × PubKey → msg.
We discuss in Section 7 how we can handle a limited notion of (randomized) concatenation. We further assume an infinite set 0 of constant symbols of sort key or msg, an infinite set Ch of constant symbols of sort channel, two infinite sets of variables X , W, and an infinite set of names N = N pub N prv of sort rand: N pub represents the random numbers drawn by the attacker, while N prv represents the random numbers drawn by the protocol's participants.
As usual, terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other terms. We denote by T (F, N , X ) the set of terms built on function symbols in F, names in N , and variables in X . We simply write T (F, N ) when X = ∅. We consider three particular signatures: pub = {senc, sdec, aenc, adec, sign, check, start}
where start / ∈ 0 is a constant symbol of sort msg. The signature pub represents the functions/data available to the attacker, including a constant start used to start sessions of the protocols. The signature + is the most general signature, while models actual messages (with no failed computation). We assume a bijection between elements of sort PrivKey and PubKey. If k is a constant of sort PrivKey, k −1 will denote its image by this function, called inverse. The inverse of the inverse function is also denoted by −1 , so that (k −1 ) −1 = k. To keep homogeneous notations, we extend this function to symmetric keys: if k is of sort SymKey, then k −1 = k. The relation between encryption and decryption is represented through the following rewriting rules, yielding a convergent rewrite system:
with k 1 of sort SymKey, k 2 of sort PubKey, and k 3 of sort PrivKey. For instance, the first rule models the fact that the decryption of a ciphertext will return the associated plaintext when the right key is used to perform decryption. The two last rules are used to model asymmetric encryption and signatures. We denote by t↓ the normal form of a term t ∈ T ( + , N , X ).
Example 2.1. The term m = senc(s, k, r) represents an encryption of the constant s with the key k using the random r ∈ N , whereas t = sdec(m, k) models the application of the decryption algorithm on m using k. We have that t↓ = s.
An attacker may build his or her own messages by applying functions to terms he or she already knows. Formally, a computation done by the attacker is modeled by a recipe, that is, a term in T ( pub , N pub , W). The variables in W intuitively refer to variables used to store messages learned by the attacker.
Process Algebra. The intended behavior of a protocol can be modeled by a process defined by the following grammar:
where u ∈ T ( , N , X ), n ∈ N , and c ∈ Ch. The process 0 does nothing, and we sometimes omit it. The process "in (c, u) .P" expects a message m of the form u on channel c and then behaves like Pθ, where θ is a substitution such that m = uθ . The process "out(c, u).P" emits u on channel c and then behaves like P. The variables that occur in u are instantiated when the evaluation takes place. The process P | Q runs P and Q in parallel. The process !P executes P some arbitrary number of times. The process new n.P invents a new name n and continues as P.
We write fv(P) for the set of free variables that occur in P, that is, the set of variables that are not in the scope of an input. A protocol is a ground process, that is, a process P such that fv(P) = ∅. Example 2.2. We consider a simplified version of the protocol presented in Denning and Sacco [1981] . The purpose of this protocol informally described next is to establish a key k AB between two participants A and B using public key encryption and signature.
The agent A sends a symmetric key k AB signed with A's private key sk A (using a fresh random number r 1 A ), and the resulting ciphertext is encrypted with B's public key pk B (using a fresh random number r 2 A ). The agent B answers this request by decrypting this message and verifying the signature. If all checks succeed, B informs the agent A by sending an acknowledgment, that is, the constant ack. The agents A and B can now use the symmetric key k AB to communicate.
The role of A is modeled by a process P A , while the role of B is modeled by P B . We have that Moreover, we have that sk
A are names of sort rand, and x ( z 1 , z 2 , respectively) is a variable of sort msg (rand, respectively).
Intuitively, P A sends k AB signed with sk A and encrypted with pk B to the agent B (branch 1). More generally, the agent A can start different sessions with different agents. Thus, the process P A models the agent A initiating a session with B (branch 1) as well as with C (branch 2). The process P B models the agent B answering a request from A. We could also consider the scenario where the agent B is also willing to talk to C or where the initiator, here played by A, is also played by other agents such as B. We consider here only a simpler case to keep the example reasonably short.
To model the whole protocol, we sent the public key pk A , pk B , pk C in clear, as well as the private key sk C , to model the fact that the attacker may learn the private keys of some corrupted agents. This is modeled through the following process P key :
Then, the whole protocol is given by P, where P A , P B , and P key evolve in parallel:
This protocol is actually insecure as demonstrated by the following attack:
A initiates a session with a malicious user C, sending him or her a key k AC . This malicious user then legally learns k AC but also its signature sign(k AC , sk A , r 1 A ) under the signing key of A. He or she may then resend this key to B in the name of A. The agent B accepts the key k AC as being a secret key between A and B.
Semantics
A configuration of a protocol is a pair (P; σ ), where -P is a multiset of processes. We often write P ∪ P, or P | P, instead of {P} ∪ P. -σ = {w 1 m 1 , . . . , w n m n } is a frame, that is, a substitution where w 1 , . . . , w n are variables in W, and m 1 , . . . , m n are terms in T ( , N ). Those terms represent the messages that are known by the attacker.
The operational semantics of protocol is defined by the relation α − → over configurations described in Figure 1 . For the sake of simplicity, we often write P instead of (P; ∅).
The first rule (IN) allows the attacker to make a process progress by feeding it with a term he or she built with publicly available terms and symbols. The second one (OUT) lets the attacker gain knowledge of a message as soon as it is sent by a process: the corresponding message is added to the substitution of the current configuration. These 
Example 2.3. Going back to the protocol introduced in Example 2.2, we consider the scenario corresponding to the attack.
(1) The public keys of all the participants are disclosed as well as the secret key sk C of the corrupted agent C. Formally, let K 0 def = (P; ∅); we have that = =========== ⇒ (P; σ 0 ), where σ 0 = {w 1 pk A , w 2 pk B , w 3 pk C , w 4 sk C }.
(2) The agent A initiates a session with C and sends the corresponding encrypted message. More formally, we have that
Hence, we have that (tr, σ ) ∈ trace(K 0 ), where
In this execution trace, first the keys pk A , pk B , pk C , and sk C are sent after having called the corresponding process. Then, branch (2) of P is triggered.
Trace Equivalence
Intuitively, two processes are equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by any attacker. Trace equivalence can be used to formalize many interesting security properties, in particular privacy-type properties, such as those studied, for instance, in Arapinis et al. [2010] and Bruso et al. [2010] . We first introduce a notion of the intruder's knowledge well suited to cryptographic primitives for which the success of decrypting or checking a signature is visible. Definition 2.4. Two frames σ 1 and σ 2 are statically equivalent, σ 1 ∼ σ 2 , when we have that dom(σ 1 ) = dom(σ 2 ), and -for any recipe R, Rσ 1 ↓ ∈ T ( , N ) if and only if Rσ 2 ↓ ∈ T ( , N ); and -for all recipes R 1 and R 2 such that R 1 σ 1 ↓, R 2 σ 1 ↓ ∈ T ( , N ), we have that
Intuitively, two frames are equivalent if an attacker cannot see the difference between the two situations they represent: if some computation fails in σ 1 , it should fail in σ 2 as well, and σ 1 and σ 2 should satisfy the same equalities.
Example 2.5. Consider the two following frames:
where k is a (private) constant in 0 . We have that σ 1 ∼ σ 2 . Indeed, consider the recipes R 1 = check(adec(w 5 , w 4 ), w 1 ) and R 2 = w 6 . We have that
Intuitively, two processes are trace equivalent if, however they behave, the resulting sequences of messages observed by the attacker are in static equivalence. Definition 2.6. Let P and Q be two protocols. We have that P Q if for every (tr, σ ) ∈ trace(P), there exists (tr , σ ) ∈ trace(Q) such that tr = tr and σ ∼ σ . They are trace equivalent, written P ≈ Q, if P Q and Q P.
Example 2.7. Continuing Example 2.2, our naive protocol is secure if the key received by B remains private. To model this, we modify the process P B as follows:
Then, to model secrecy of the key received by B, we consider the following equivalence:
An attacker should not distinguish between two instances of the protocol, one where B used the key established through the protocol and one where a magic key k is used instead.
However, our protocol is insecure. An attacker may easily learn k AC and send to B a message of the expected form (as if it were issued by A) that will contain this corrupted key instead of k AB . Formally, we have that
This is reflected by the trace tr described as follows:
where r C is a name in N pub .
We have that (tr , σ 1 ) ∈ trace(K 0 ) with K 0 = (P A | P l B | P key ; σ 1 ) and σ 1 as defined in Example 2.5. Because of the existence of only one branch using each channel, there is only one possible execution of P A | P r B | P key (up to a bijective renaming of the private names of sort rand) matching the labels in tr , and the corresponding execution will allow us to reach the frame σ 2 as described in Example 2.5. We have already seen that static equivalence does not hold, that is, σ 1 ∼ σ 2 .
From Security Protocols to Pushdown Automata 3:9
PING-PONG PROTOCOLS
We aim at providing a decidability result for the problem of trace equivalence between protocols in the presence of replication. However, it is well known that replication leads to undecidability even for the simple case of reachability properties. Thus, we consider a class of protocols, called C pp , for which (in a slightly different setting), reachability has already been proved decidable [Comon-Lundh and Cortier 2003 ].
Class C pp
We basically consider ping-pong protocols (an output is computed using only the message previously received in input), and we assume a kind of determinism. Moreover, we restrict the terms that are manipulated throughout the protocols: only one unknown message (modeled by the use of a variable of sort msg) can be received at each step.
We fix a variable x ∈ X of sort msg. An input term (output term, respectively) is a term defined by the following grammars given:
where s, k ∈ 0 ∪ {start}, z ∈ X , f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}, and r ∈ N . Intuitively, no destructor should be used explicitly. Moreover, we assume that each variable (name, respectively) occurs at most once in u ( v, respectively).
Definition 3.1. C pp is the class of protocol of the form 
is called a branch of P. Item 1 holds for any process representing a protocol: the variables of the output should be bound by the input. Item 2 enforces a deterministic behavior: a particular input action can only be accepted by one branch of the protocol. This is a natural restriction since most of the protocols are indeed deterministic: an agent should usually know exactly what to do once he or she has received a message. Actually, the main limitations of the class C pp is that we consider a restricted signature (e.g., no pair, no hash function), and names can only be used to produce randomized ciphertexts.
Example 3.2. The protocols described in Example 2.7 are in C pp . For instance, we can check that -aenc(sign(x, sk A , z 1 ), pk B , z 2 ) is an input term, and -aenc(sign(k AB , sk A , r 1 A ), pk B , r 2 A ) is an output term. Moreover, the determinism condition (item 2) is clearly satisfied: each branch of the protocol P A | P l B | P key (P A | P r B | P key , respectively) uses a different channel. When studying trace equivalence (or even trace inclusion), we can even safely force a process to perform an input action followed directly by its associated output action.
1 That is, there does not exist θ such that u
We consider a set of "big-step" traces, defined as follows:
=⇒ (P; σ ) for some configuration (P; σ ) with tr sequence of input-output blocks.
The notion of trace inclusion (trace equivalence, respectively) w.r.t. big-step traces is defined accordingly. Definition 3.3. Let P and Q be two protocols. We have that P io * Q if for every (tr, σ ) ∈ trace io * (P), there exists (tr , σ ) ∈ trace io * (Q) such that tr = tr and σ ∼ σ . They are trace equivalent, written P ≈ io * Q, if P io * Q and Q io * P.
Due to the form of protocols in C pp , any trace made up of input and output actions can first be completed with all the available output actions and then be mapped to a trace that is made up of input-output blocks only. Thus, we have that the two notions of trace equivalence coincide. PROPOSITION 3.4. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp . We have that P io * Q if and only if P Q.
This proposition easily follows from the fact that for any process of C pp , any input is immediately followed by an output.
Main Results
Our first main contribution is a decision procedure for trace equivalence of processes in C pp . THEOREM 3.5. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp . The problem whether P and Q are trace equivalent, that is, P ≈ Q, is decidable.
Deciding trace equivalence is done in two main steps:
(1) First, we show how to reduce trace equivalence between protocols in C pp to the problem of deciding trace equivalence (still between protocols in C pp ) when the attacker acts as a forwarder, that is, when the attacker may only forward messages obtained through the protocol. This step is detailed in Section 4. (2) Then, we encode the problem of deciding trace equivalence for forwarding attackers into the problem of language equivalence for real-time generalized pushdown deterministic automata (GPDA), that is, deterministic pushdown automata with no epsilon-transition but such that the automata may unstack several symbols at a time. This step is detailed in Section 5.
We also provide an implementation of our translation from protocols to pushdown automata, yielding a tool for automatically checking equivalence of security protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. This contribution is described in Section 7.
Actually, we characterize equivalence of protocols in terms of equivalence of GPDA. Indeed, Step (2) shows how to associate to a process P an automata A P such that two processes are equivalent if and only if their corresponding automata yield the same language. Conversely, we also show how to associate to an automata A a process P A such that two automata yield the same language if and only if their corresponding processes are equivalent. This reverse encoding from pushdown automata to protocols is explained in Section 6.
Our second contribution is an undecidability result. The class C pp is somewhat limited, but extending C pp to nondeterministic processes immediately yields undecidability of trace equivalence. More precisely, we have that trace inclusion of processes in C pp is undecidable. THEOREM 3.6. The following problem is undecidable:
Input. P and Q two protocols in C pp .
Output. Whether P is trace included in Q, that is, P Q.
A direct encoding of the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) into an inclusion of two protocols of this class is given in Appendix A. Alternatively, this undecidability result is also a consequence of the reduction result established in Section 6 and the undecidability result established in Friedman [1976] . Nonetheless, we present in Appendix A the direct encoding of PCP into protocol equivalence since some ideas might be reused to show undecidability of trace equivalence for some other classes, whereas the alternative proof required a first encoding to transform a protocol into a pushdown automaton.
Undecidability of trace inclusion actually implies undecidability of trace equivalence as soon as processes are nondeterministic. Indeed, consider the choice operator + whose (standard) semantics is given by the following rules:
COROLLARY 3.7. Let P, Q 1 , and Q 2 be three protocols in C pp . The problem whether P is equivalent to
Indeed, consider P and Q 1 , for which trace inclusion encodes PCP, and let Q 2 = P. Trivially, P Q 1 + Q 2 . Thus, P ≈ Q 1 + Q 2 if and only if Q 1 + Q 2 P, that is, if and only if Q 1 P, hence the undecidability result.
GETTING RID OF THE FULL ATTACKER
We show in this section how to reduce trace equivalence between protocols in C pp to the problem of deciding trace equivalence (still between protocols in C pp ) when the attacker acts as a forwarder, that is, when the attacker may only forward messages obtained through the protocols. This new semantics induced a new notion of trace equivalence, denoted ≈ fwd , which is formally defined in Section 4.1.
To counterbalance the effects of this simple forwarder semantics, the key idea consists of modifying the protocols under study by adding new rules that encrypt and decrypt messages on demand for the forwarder. Formally, we define a transformation T fwd (see Section 4.2) that associates to a pair of protocols in C pp a finite set of pairs of protocols (still in C pp ), and we show the following result: PROPOSITION 4.1. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp . We have that P ≈ Q if and only if P ≈ fwd Q for some (P , Q ) ∈ T fwd (P, Q).
Forwarder Semantics
We first define the actions of a forwarder by modifying our semantics. Roughly, we restrict the recipes R, R 1 , and R 2 that are used in the IN rule and in static equivalence (Definition 2.4) to be either the public constant start or a variable in W. Intuitively, this corresponds to the fact that the forwarder attacker should no longer build a message on his or her own. This leads us to consider a new relation − → fwd between configurations, which is the relation induced by the rules described in Figure 2 we define its set of traces w.r.t. the forwarder semantics as follows:
for some configuration (P; σ ) (tr, σ ) with tr sequence of input-output blocks.
⎫ ⎬ ⎭
We also need to adapt our notion of static equivalence.
Definition 4.2. Two frames σ 1 and σ 2 are statically equivalent w.r.t. the forwarder semantics, denoted σ 1 ∼ fwd σ 2 , when we have that dom(σ 1 ) = dom(σ 2 ), and for all recipes R 1 and R 2 in {start} ∪ W, we have that
This induces a new notion of trace equivalence, which is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.3. Let P and Q be two protocols. We have that P fwd Q if for every (tr, σ ) ∈ trace fwd (P), there exists (tr , σ ) ∈ trace fwd (Q) such that tr = tr and σ ∼ fwd σ . They are trace equivalent w.r.t. the forwarder semantics, written P ≈ fwd Q, if P fwd Q and Q fwd P.
Example 4.4. The trace exhibited in Example 2.3 is still a valid one according to the forwarder semantics, but the frames σ 1 and σ 2 described in Example 2.5 are now in equivalence w.r.t. ∼ fwd . Actually, we have that P A | P l B | P key ≈ fwd P A | P r B | P key . Indeed, the fact that a forwarder simply acts as a relay prevents him or her from mounting the aforementioned attack.
Toward a Forwarder Attacker
As illustrated in Example 4.4, the forwarder semantics is very restrictive: a forwarder cannot rely on his or her deduction capabilities to mount an attack. We show, however, that we can still restrict ourselves to trace equivalence w.r.t. a forwarder.
Intuitively, we transform any two processes P, Q into processesP,Q such that P ≈ Q if and only ifP ≈ fwdQ . Roughly, this transformation consists of two steps:
(1) First, we guess among the keys of the protocols P and the keys of the protocols Q those that are deducible by the attacker, as well as a bijection α between these two sets. We can show that such a bijection necessarily exists when P ≈ Q. (2) Then, to compensate for the fact that the attacker is a simple forwarder, we give him or her access to encryption/decryption oracles for any deducible key k, adding branches in the processes.
To maintain the equivalence, we do a similar transformation in both P and Q relying on the bijection α. We ensure that the set of deducible keys has been correctly guessed by adding of some extra processes. Then the main step of the proof consists of showing that the forwarder has now the same power as a full attacker, even though he or she cannot reuse the same randomness in two distinct encryptions, as a real attacker could.
Example 4.5. To better illustrate this section, we consider a variant of the processes introduced in Section 2, where agent A is now willing to talk only to B:
are defined in Example 2.7 and P key is defined in Example 2.2, whereas P A is defined as follows (only the first branch of P A ):
This scenario excludes the aforementioned attack and we have that P ≈ Q. This has been formally checked using our prototype (see Section 7).
4.2.1. Guessing Deducible Keys. The purpose of this section is to restrict our attention to protocols that explicitly disclose their deducible keys K P and K Q . Since we do not want to rely on a particular procedure for computing these two sets, the idea is to guess a possible superset of each set, namely, K and K , and then ensure that these sets K and K contain at least the deducible keys.
Definition 4.6. Let P be a protocol in C pp . A term t is deducible in P if there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) and a recipe R (i.e., a term in
Example 4.7. Continuing Example 4.5, we have that P and Q are in C pp . It is easy to notice that k AB is deducible in P, whereas k is deducible in Q, since these keys are revealed at the end of B's execution. For both P and Q, the trace tr = in(c A , start). out(c A , w 1 ).in(c B , w 1 ).out(c B , w 2 ) and the recipe R = w 2 is a witness of this fact.
Two equivalent processes have the same set of deducible keys, up to some bijective renaming.
LEMMA 4.8. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp and K P (K Q , respectively) be the set of deducible constants of sort key that occur in P (Q, respectively); if P ≈ Q, then there exists a unique bijection α from K P to K Q such that for every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P), there exists a trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that for any recipe R and any k ∈ K P :
-Rφ↓ is of sort s if and only if Rψ↓ is of sort s,
where s ∈ {SymKey, PubKey, PrivKey}; -Rφ↓ = k if and only if Rψ↓ = α(k); and
and conversely, for every (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) satisfying the same properties.
PROOF. (sketch)
The relation α is defined as follows:
for every k ∈ K P of sort s and every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) and recipe R such that Rφ↓ = k, we define α(k) = Rψ↓, where ψ is the only frame such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q).
The existence of such a frame comes from the fact that P ≈ Q, whereas its unicity is a consequence of the determinism of protocols in C pp . Then, we show that this relation α is uniquely defined and satisfies all the requirements exploiting the strong relationship between P and Q through the relation P ≈ Q.
Example 4.9. Continuing Example 4.5, we have
The unique bijection α mentioned in the previous lemma is defined as follows: α(k AB ) = k, and α(k ) = k otherwise. Definition 4.10. Let P be a protocol in C pp and K be a set of constants of sort key that occur in P. If for every k ∈ K there exist a channel name c k and a branch !in(c k , start).out(c k , k) in P, then P is said to disclose K.
Example 4.11. Continuing our running example, P and Q clearly disclose K = {pk A , pk B , pk C , sk C }.
LEMMA 4.12. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp and S (S , respectively) the set of keys of P (Q, respectively). Then P ≈ Q if and only if there exist two sets K ⊆ S and K ⊆ S and a bijection α : K → K such thatP ≈Q, where:
and 0, 1 are new constants and c 0 , c 1 , the c k,α(k) , and c are fresh channels. Moreover, assuming the existence of such sets and bijection such thatP ≈Q, the two protocols are disclosing their deducible keys.
We call T key (P, Q) the set of such pairs (P,Q) of modified protocols.
PROOF. Let K P (K Q , respectively) be the set of deducible constants of sort key that occur in P (Q, respectively). We prove the two directions separately.
(⇒) If P ≈ Q, by Lemma 4.8, for K = K P and K = K Q , we get the existence of such a bijection α. Because keys in S K P and S K Q are not deducible, the branches on channel c can never be triggered. Moreover, as P ≈ Q, any trace of P (Q, respectively) inputting or outputting on a channel c k,α(k) for k in K P can be matched in Q (P, respectively). Indeed, for every couple (k, k −1 ) of deducible keys and for any recipe reducing to k (k −1 , respectively) in P, the same recipe reduces to α(k) (α(k) −1 , respectively) in Q, thanks to the properties of α described in Lemma 4.8.
(⇐) For the converse implication, we first remark that necessarily we have that K P ⊆ K and K Q ⊆ K . Indeed, suppose there exists, for instance, k ∈ K P K. Since k is deducible, there exist a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) and a recipe R such that Rφ↓ = k. Since (tr, φ) is also a trace ofP, we consider the trace
along with its frame φ = φ ∪ {w |φ|+1 0, w |φ|+2 0, w |φ|+3 1}. IfP ≈Q, then there exists (tr , ψ ) ∈ trace(Q) such that φ and ψ are statically equivalent. But any output on c in Q leads to the constant 1, breaking static equivalence. We conclude in a similar way in case k ∈ K Q \ K . Finally, we need to prove thatP ≈Q implies P ≈ Q. For every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P), (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P), and asP ≈Q, there exists a trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that φ is statically equivalent to ψ. Because c 0 , c 1 , c, and the c k,α(k) are new channels, tr does not use transitions on those, and thus (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). The same goes for any trace of Q, hence showing the trace equivalence of P and Q. Example 4.13. Continuing our example, let K = K P and K = K Q , and α is the bijection defined in Example 4.9. Checking equivalence of P ≈ Q amounts to checking whetherP ≈Q, whereP andQ are defined as follows:
IfP ≈Q, then sk A and sk B cannot be deducible and thusP andQ disclose their set of deducible keys.
Adding Oracles.
To compensate for the fact that the attacker is a simple forwarder, we give him or her access to encryption/decryption oracles for any deducible key k, adding branches in the processes. We rely on the bijection α computed in the previous section to do this in a compatible way on both sides of the equivalence.
LEMMA 4.14. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp respectively disclosing two sets of keys K and K as in Lemma 4.12. Then P ≈ Q if and only ifP ≈ fwdQ , wherē
where K s denotes the keys of sort s of K. We call T oracle the transformation taking a pair of protocols (P, Q) satisfying the aforementioned condition and returning the pair (P,Q) presently defined.
PROOF (sketch). First, thanks to Lemma 4.12, we know that P,P, Q, andQ disclose all their deducible keys.
(⇒) Given a witness of nonequivalence forP ≈ fwdQ , it is quite easy to build a witness of nonequivalence for P ≈ Q replacing the use of the oracle by the corresponding attacker construction. This yields a witness of nonequivalence for P ≈ Q.
(⇐) This direction is actually more involved. The idea is to replace the use of an attacker construction, for example, an encryption with a deducible key, by the corresponding oracle. However, the attacker has the ability to use the same random seed more than once, whereas this is impossible when using the oracles to perform those computations. Thus, we first show that this additional ability does not give any power to the attacker. Then, we do the replacement as expected in order to conclude.
The full proof is provided in Appendix B.2.
Example 4.15. Continuing our example, this last transformation will add 10 branches (two per deducible key). For instance, regarding the key k AB , the two following branches will be be added:
For process P:
Regarding the keys pk A , pk B , pk C , and sk A , since α(k ) = k for each of these keys, we add the following branches on both sides:
4.2.3. Transformation T fwd . Thanks to Lemmas 4.12 and 4.14, we are now able to formally define our transformation that gets rid of a fully active attacker. For every pair of protocols (P, Q) in C pp , we consider
Combination of the two previous results yields the desired result. PROPOSITION 4.16. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp . We have that P ≈ Q if and only if P ≈ fwd Q for some (P , Q ) ∈ T fwd (P, Q).
ENCODING PROTOCOLS INTO REAL-TIME GPDAS
We first introduce the notion of a real-time generalized pushdown automaton (GPDA) (see Section 5.1) before explaining in detail (see Sections 5.2 and 5.3) our encoding from protocols to real-time generalized pushdown automata. More precisely, for any process P ∈ C pp , we show that it is possible to define a polynomial-sized real-time generalized pushdown automaton A P such that trace equivalence w.r.t. the forwarder semantics coincides with language equivalence of the two corresponding automata. THEOREM 5.1. Let P and Q in C pp . We have that
The proof of this theorem consists of three main steps:
(1) First, we provide a new characterization of trace equivalence w.r.t. the forwarder semantics. Intuitively, we show that it is not necessary to consider all possible tests (when checking static equivalence). Indeed, our Lemma 5.8 states that it is sufficient to check for constant tests (i.e., tests of the form x = c, where c is a constant) and some specific class of tests that we call guarded and pulled up. (2) Then we associate to processes P, Q ∈ C pp real-time GPDAs that check whether they satisfy the same constant tests (Lemma 5.9). (3) Then we associate to processes P, Q ∈ C pp real-time GPDAs that check whether they satisfy the same guarded tests (Lemma 5.11).
Throughout this section, we illustrate the definitions with the protocol displayed in Figure 3 . This example should be read step by step when reading the examples of this section. 
Generalized Pushdown Automata
Language equivalence of deterministic pushdown automata (DPA) is known to be decidable [Sénizergues 2001 ]. We actually encode equivalence of protocols into a fragment of DPA: real-time GPDA with final-state acceptance. GPDAs differ from deterministic pushdown automata (DPA) as they can unstack several symbols at a time. Real-time automata are automata that do not include epsilon-transitions. Formally, the class of real-time GPDA is defined as follows:
, where Q is a finite set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is an initial state, Q f ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states, is a finite input alphabet, is a finite stack alphabet, ω is the initial stack symbol, and δ : (Q × × 0 ) → Q × 0 is a partial transition function such that -0 is a finite subset of * ; and -for any (q, a, x) ∈ dom(δ) and y suffix strict of x, we have that (q, a, y) ∈ dom(δ). (q u , ) . For the sake of clarity, a transition from q to q reading a, popping γ from the stack, and pushing u will be denoted by q a;γ /u − −− → q . Let A be a GPDA. The language recognized by A is defined by
Note that the language is defined starting with the word ωstart in the stack. A real-time GPDA can easily be converted into a DPA by adding new states and -transitions. Thus, the problem of language equivalence for two real-time GPDAs A 1 and A 2 , that is, deciding whether L(A 1 ) = L(A 2 ), is decidable [Sénizergues 2001 ]. Whether deciding equivalence of real-time GPDA could be easier than deciding equivalence of DPA is an open question.
Characterization of Trace Equivalence
To construct the automaton associated to a process P ∈ C pp , we need to construct an automaton that recognizes any execution of P and the corresponding valid tests.
We first propose a new characterization of trace equivalence allowing us to restrict our attention to executions of P and valid tests that have a special form.
Given an execution trace (tr, σ ) and an element w of a frame σ , we can extract from tr the sequence of actions that were conducted for the production of this element w.
Definition 5.3. Let P be a protocol in C pp ; tr be a trace of P w.r.t. the forwarder semantics, that is, such that (tr, σ ) ∈ trace fwd (P) for some σ ; and w be a variable that occurs in tr. The sequence associated to w in tr, denoted seq tr (w), is the subsequence of tr of the following form:
Example 5.4. Consider the protocol defined in Figure 3 . Then, -seq tr 1 .tr 2 (w 5 ) = tr 1 ; -seq tr 1 .tr 2 (w 8 ) = io(c 1 , start, w 1 ).tr 2 ; -seq tr 1 .tr 2 (w 7 ) = tr 1 .io(c 4 , w 5 .w 6 ).io(c 5 , w 6 , w 7 ); and -seq tr 1 .tr 2 (w 9 ) = tr 1 .io(c 4 , w 5 , w 8 ).io(c 5 , w 8 , w 9 ).
We consider some particular class of tests, called pulled-up tests.
Definition 5.5. Let P be a protocol in C pp , (tr, σ ) ∈ trace fwd (P), and w, w ∈ dom(σ ) such that
(1) the test w = w is σ -valid, that is, wσ = w σ ; and (2) the test w = w is σ -guarded; that is, the head symbol of wσ (or equivalently w σ ) is in {senc, aenc, sign}.
Let io(c i 0 , start, w j 0 ) . . . io(c i p , w j p−1 , w j p ) be the maximal common prefix of seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). The test w = w is said to be pulled up in (tr, σ ) if p = 0, or p ≥ 1 and wσ does not occur as a subterm in w j 0 σ, . . . , w j p−1 σ .
Intuitively, to perform a test w = w , the attacker (who acts as a forwarder) relies on the protocol rules to produce successive outputs, and ultimately the ones stored in w and w . The attacker may produce w and w independently (the common prefix of seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ) is empty), and in such a case the test is pulled up by definition. This is not, of course, always possible. In particular, a test w = w satisfying conditions (1) and (2) of the previous definition is necessarily a "forked" test, that is, a test for which the common prefix of seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ) is not reduced to the empty sequence, and thus p ≥ 1. Indeed, wσ is a term of the form f(u, k, r) with some random r. Since nonces are uniquely generated, the variable w i that generates it, that is, the smallest i such that r occurs in w i σ , occurs both in seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). For this kind of "forked" test, we can restrict the attacker to consider tests that are pulled up; that is, we consider tests for which the size of the common prefix between seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ) is reduced to the minimum. This can be done by duplicating some execution steps since all the branches are under a replication.
Example 5.6. Continuing our running example, we have that w 5 = w 8 is a test that is σ 1/2 -valid but it is not σ 1/2 -guarded since w 5 σ 1/2 = w 8 σ 1/2 = a.
The test w 7 = w 9 is a test that is σ 1/2 -valid and σ 1/2 -guarded. Indeed, we have that w 7 σ 1/2 = w 9 σ 1/2 = senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ). The maximal common prefix of seq tr 1 .tr 2 (w 7 ) and seq tr 1 .tr 2 (w 9 ) is actually tr 1 = io(c 1 , start, w 1 ).io(c 2 , w 1 , w 2 ).io(c 3 , w 2 , w 3 ).io(c 4 , w 3 , w 4 ).io(c 3 , w 4 , w 5 ).
Actually, w 7 σ 1/2 occurs as a subterm in w 4 σ 1/2 , and thus the test w 7 = w 9 is not pulled up in (tr 1 .tr 2 , σ 1/2 ).
We are now able to state our characterization lemma. Intuitively, we show that for tests that are valid and guarded, it is sufficient to consider pulled-up tests. We first illustrate through an example how a test that is valid and guarded can be converted into a pulled-up one.
Example 5.7. Continuing Example 5.4, we consider the test w 7 = w 9 , which is not pulled up in (tr 1 .tr 2 , σ 1/2 ). Consider the execution tr = tr 1 .io(c 4 , w 5 , w 6 ).io(c 5 , w 6 , w 7 ).io(c 3 , w 4 , w 8 ).io(c 4 , w 8 , w 9 ).io(c 5 , w 9 , w 10 ).
This execution is almost similar to tr 1 .tr 2 . The main difference is that the computation performed at the end of tr 1 using channel c 3 with input w 4 is duplicated. Both io(c 3 , w 4 , w 5 ) and io(c 3 , w 4 , w 8 ) occur in tr . The resulting frame is σ 1 ∪ {w 6 senc(senc(senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), k 2 , r 7 ), k 1 , r 8 ), w 7 senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), w 8 senc(senc(senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), k 1 , r 5 ), k 2 , r 6 ), w 9 senc(senc(senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), k 2 , r 7 ), k 1 , r 8 ), w 10 senc(a, k 2 , r 4 )}.
The terms stored in w 5 and w 8 differ by their random seeds: senc(senc(senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), k 1 , r 5 ), k 2 , r 6 ) and senc(senc(senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), k 1 , r 5 ), k 2 , r 6 ).
This frame is almost the same as σ 1/2 with an additional element (w 8 ). The term stored in w 8 is the same as the one stored in w 5 up to the choice of some random seeds (r 6 is replaced by the fresh random r 6 ). Moreover, the presence of this additional element leads us to reindex the following elements of the frame and to replace some occurrences of r 6 with r 6 . It is important to note that the introduced randoms r 6 and r 8 could potentially break equality tests. They, however, do not appear anymore in the last outputted term stored in w 10 that is checked for equality.
This example shows that when considering the trace (tr 1 .tr 2 , σ 1/2 ), we may have to consider the test w 7 = w 9 , which is not pulled up. However, this test is essentially the same as the pulled-up test w 7 = w 10 issued from the trace given earlier.
The transformation explained in the previous example can be generalized to any protocol.
LEMMA 5.8. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp , and then P ≈ fwd Q if and only if the following four conditions are satisfied: -CONST P : For all (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), there exists a frame σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q) and for every w, w ∈ dom(σ P ) and for every constant c ∈ 0 ∪ {start}, wσ P = w σ Q = c if and only if there exists a constant c ∈ 0 ∪ {start} such that
Similarly swapping the roles of P and Q. -GUARDED P : For all (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), there exists a frame σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q) and every test that is σ P -valid, σ P -guarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ P ) is also σ Q -valid, σ Q -guarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ Q ). -GUARDED Q : Similarly swapping the roles of P and Q. PROOF (sketch). (⇒) For this direction, when considering CONST P , the only difficulty is to show that the test wσ Q = w σ Q leads to a constant c . Actually, such a test cannot lead to a guarded test since otherwise a replay of the entire sequence (this replay is possible since we consider a class of protocol that allows this) will lead to a different guarded term in Q and not in P (due to the presence of fresh randoms in guarded terms).
When considering GUARDED P , the difficulty is to show that the test w = w is necessarily pulled up in (tr, σ Q ). Let pref = io(c i 0 , start, w j 0 ) . . . io(c i p , w j p−1 , w j p ) be the maximal common prefix of seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). Since w = w is pulled up in (tr, σ P ), we know that the first occurrence of wσ P in prefσ P is at the very end of the sequence. We can easily show that w = w is σ Q -valid and σ Q -guarded, and thus wσ Q occurs also as a subterm in prefσ Q . The only problem is if wσ Q occurs in prefσ Q but not at the very end of this sequence. The idea is that in such a case, we can modify the trace (tr, σ Q ) and the test w = w to build (tr * , σ * Q ) and a new test w * = w * , which will be pulled up in (tr * , σ * Q ). The idea is to split the two sequences seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ) earlier without compromising the fact that the test will be valid in the resulting frame. This corresponds to the construction illustrated in Example 5.7. This trace tr * is actually a witness of nonequivalence. Actually, the test w * = w * is a fortiori not valid on the P side, and this contradicts our hypothesis P ≈ fwd Q.
(⇐) Actually, for this direction, assume that we have a witness of the fact that P ≈ Q, that is, a trace (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), a trace (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q), and a test w = w that is σ P -valid but not σ Q -valid. In case the resulting term is a constant, we easily conclude that CONST P fails. Otherwise, it means that w = w is σ P -guarded. In order to show that GUARDED P fails, we have to ensure that the test w = w is pulled up w.r.t. (tr, σ P ). Since this is not necessarily the case, we have to build another trace (tr * , σ * P ) that will lead us to a pulled-up test. Roughly, the transformation consists of splitting the two sequences seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ) earlier without compromising the fact that the test will be valid in the resulting frame. Actually, such a transformation cannot transform a test that was not valid in a valid one, and thus this test is still not valid for Q and it is still a witness of nonequivalence, but a pulled-up one allowing us to conclude.
The detailed proof can be found in Appendix C.1.
From Trace Equivalence to Language Equivalence
Our goal is to associate an automaton A P to a protocol P such that A P recognizes the words (a sequence of channels) that correspond to a possible execution of the protocol. The stack of the automaton A P is used to store a (partial) representation of the last outputted term. This first requires us to convert a term into a word.
Given an input term or an output term u (see Section 3.1), we define inductivelyū in the following way:
where denotes the empty word. Note that, using this representation, random seeds are not part of the encoding. We denote by ||u|| the height of the term u, which is equal to the number of occurrences of senc, aenc, and sign in u.
We now consider an arbitrary ping-pong protocol P (using the same notation as the one introduced in Section 3):
In the remainder of the section, we denote by P 0 the finite set of constants of 0 ∪ {start} that actually occur in the protocol P.
5.3.1. Encoding of the Conditions CONST P and CONST Q . We first build an automaton that recognizes tests of the form w = w such that the corresponding term is actually a constant. We define A P CONST as follows:
where the transition function δ is defined as follows:
(1) for every q ∈ {q 0 } ∪ {q c | c ∈ 
The automaton is depicted in Figure 4 . Intuitively, the basic building blocks (e.g., q 0 with the transitions from q 0 to itself) mimic an execution of P where each input is fed with the last outputted term. Then, to recognize the tests of the form w = w that are true in such an execution, it is sufficient to memorize the constant c that is associated to w (adding a new state q c ) and to see whether it is possible to reach a state where the stack contains c again. More formally, we have the following result. Example 5.10. Going back to our running example, that is, the protocol P described in Figure 3 From Security Protocols to Pushdown Automata
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The word that represents the trace (tr 1 .tr 2 , σ 1/2 ) and the test w 5 = w 8 as given in Figure 3 is c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 c 5 c test c 1 c 3 c 2 c 5 c end . The fact that this test is a valid one that leads to a constant a means that the word will be accepted by the automaton given previously. The corresponding run goes through the state q a and halts in state q f .
A P CONST has a number of states polynomial in the number of constants in P and for each state a number of transitions linear in the number of branches in P. Thus, A P CONST is of size polynomial with respect to the size of P.
5.3.2. Encoding of the Conditions GUARDED P and GUARDED Q . Capturing tests that lead to nonconstant symbols (i.e., terms of the form f(u, k, r) with f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}) is more tricky for several reasons. First, it is not possible anymore to memorize the resulting term in a state of the automaton. Second, names of sort rand play a role in such a test, while they are forgotten in our encoding. We rely on our characterization introduced in Section 5.2, and we construct a more complex automaton that uses some special track symbols to encode when randomized ciphertexts may be reused.
More precisely, we consider
Note that n and p i are induced by the definition of protocol P (see Equation ( * )). The input alphabet contains the channel names c 1 , . . . , c n , plus some additional symbols, denoted c 1 fork , . . . , c n fork , that will be used once and whose purpose will be to mark the end of the common prefix between seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ).
The stack alphabet is more involved. We still have one symbol per constant in
and a special symbol test that will be put on top of the stack when the stack contains the target term (i.e., wσ ). In such an automaton, the idea is to consider pulled-up tests only. The tile (fork j i , k) is placed on the stack when the automaton has finished to build the term corresponding to the left-hand side of a pulled-up test.
The transition function δ is defined as follows:
(1) for q ∈ {q 0 , q 1 , q 2 }, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , p i }, there is a transition −−−−→ q 1 (item 2) enable him or her to mark a fork when building a test in his or her frame with a particular stack symbol fork j i , enriched with some information. Intuitively, the part of the execution that is performed until here should correspond to the maximal prefix shared between the sequences seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). By looping in q 1 , the attacker can continue building the first term of an equality, following the usual execution of the protocol, if it were for the presence of the stack symbol (fork j i , k), which can only go down on the stack for at most k − 1 times. When the symbol (fork j i , k) appears on top of the stack, the attacker may decide that he or she has built the first part of a pulled-up test. Then test will be put on the top of the stack and a part of the stack (following the instructions memorized in the symbol (fork j i , k)) will be regenerated. The idea is that the stack has to contain the same term as the one stored just after forking. Then the attacker tries to build the second member of the test. If this second term manages to end up exactly as the previous one (the position in the stack is marked using the tile test), an equality is reached and the word is recognized by the automata, witnessing the equality induced by the pulled-up test.
What remains now is to prove that P and Q satisfy conditions GUARDED P and
. This is formally stated in the following lemma. The proof can be found in Appendix C.2.
Example 5.12. Going back to our running example, that is, the protocol P described in Figure 3 , the automaton A P GUARDED is depicted as follows:
The set of transitions R is the one defined in Example 5.10. The situation where the stack symbol (fork 
The trace (tr, σ ) ∈ trace fwd (P) and the pulled-up test w = w that correspond to this execution are the ones introduced in Example 5.7, that is, tr together with the test w 7 = w 10 .
We can notice that up to the special stack symbols, namely, test and (fork j i , k), the contents of the stack after reading c i fork (here i = 4) and c test are the same. The stack actually represents the term obtained after executing the common prefix shared between seq tr (w 7 ) and seq tr (w 10 ), that is, senc(senc(a, k 2 , r 4 ), k 1 , r 5 ) stored in w 4 . We have also that the contents of the stack before reading c test and after reading c end are also the same (up to some special stack symbols). They actually represent the terms stored respectively in w 7 and w 10 .
Note that A P GUARDED has a fixed number of states and a polynomial number of transitions: transitions are added for each branch and suffix of any input term. Thus, A P GUARDED is of size polynomial with respect to the size of P.
FROM LANGUAGE EQUIVALENCE TO TRACE EQUIVALENCE
We have seen how to encode trace equivalence between processes in C pp into language equivalence between real-time GPDA. The two problems are actually equivalent. Indeed, in this section, we show that we can conversely encode any real-time GPDA A into a process
Consider an automaton A = (Q, , , q 0 , ω, Q f , δ). The process P A associated to A is built using symmetric encryption only. For the purpose of the encoding, we consider the following constants of sort SymKey:
-for each q ∈ Q, we denote q its counterpart in 0 ; -for each α ∈ , we denote k α its counterpart in 0 ; and -a constant k well .
Let also c 0 , c a , c f with a ∈ be constant symbols of sort channel in Ch. Words in * , that is, stacks, will be represented through nested encryptions with keys representing their counterparts in . For the sake of brevity, given a word u = α 1 . . . α p of * , we denote by x.u -either the term senc(. . . senc(x, k α 1 , z 1 ) . . . , k α p , z p ), where z 1 through z p are variables used for nonces when x.u is used in as an input pattern; -or the term senc(. . . senc(x, k α 1 , r 1 ) . . . , k α p , r p ), where r 1 through r p are fresh randoms when x.u is used as an output pattern.
Next, we use newr as a shortcut for new r 1 . . . . new r p such that the sequence will bind every nonce occurring in the following output. The stack of the automaton A is encoded as a pile of encryptions (where each key encodes a letter of the stack). Then, upon receiving such a pile of encryptions encrypted by q on channel c a , the process P A will mimic the transition of A that is triggered when the automaton is at state q upon reading a with the stack corresponding to that pile of encryptions.
More formally, the process P A is defined as follows:
where a quantifies over , q over Q, u over words in * such that (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ), q f over Q f , and (q , v) = δ(q, a, u). Lastly, u ranges over U q,a def = α · SS q,a S q,a , where S q,a (SS q,a , respectively) is the set that contains suffixes (strict suffixes, respectively) of some u with (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ). This set U q,a corresponds intuitively to the set of shortest words that are not suffixes of any word in {u | (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ)} and, thus, the shortest words to unstack to be sure that no transition from q reading a is possible in the automaton.
Example 6.1. Consider a real-time GPDA such that = {α, β, γ , ω}, q ∈ Q, and a ∈ . Assume that {u | (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ)} = {βα, βαα}. We have SS q,a = { , α, αα} and S q,a = SS q,a ∪ {βα, βαα}. Thus, we have that U q,a = {ω, β, γ , ωα, γ α, ωαα, ααα, γ αα}.
In the previous encoding, the branches (0) and (1) mimic the behavior of the automaton A. Branch (2) is triggered in case a final state q f is reached. In case we are considering a behavior that is not authorized by the automaton, we obtain a message encrypted with k well through branches (1a). Then branches (1b) allow us to pursue the execution of the protocol outputting messages that look fresh. LEMMA 6.2. The protocol P A described earlier is in C pp and of size polynomial w.r.t. A.
PROOF. First, note that because dom(δ) is finite, as the automaton is finitely described, the sets {u | (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ)} and U q,a are also finite for any a ∈ and q ∈ Q. Moreover, the automaton being deterministic, given q ∈ Q and a ∈ , for every word s ∈ * :
-either there exists a unique suffix u of s such that (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ); -or there exists a unique suffix u of s such that u ∈ U q,a , and this disjunction is exclusive. This allows us to ensure that condition (2) of Definition 3.1 is satisfied, and thus P A belongs to C pp . Regarding the size of the protocol, the only nontrivial point is to check that the number of branches (1a) is polynomially bounded. Let q ∈ Q and a ∈ , and assume that the maximal length of a word u in a transition q a;u/v −−→ q of the automaton is q,a ; we have that the number of branches (1a) for state q and letter a is bounded by q,a × # × #{u | (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ)}, where #S is the cardinality of set S. This allows us to conclude. This polynomial encoding preserves inclusion.
PROPOSITION 6.3. Let A and B be two real-time GPDAs. We have that
PROOF. Let A = (Q, , , q 0 , ω, Q f , δ) and B = (Q , , , q 0 , ω, Q f , δ ) . We show the two implications separately. (⇐) Assume that there exists a word t ∈ L(A) L(B). We will build a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P A ) such that there exists no trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P B ), allowing us to conclude that P A P B . To build (tr, φ), we will mimic the behavior of A when reading t. The first branch to use is (0), enabling the attacker to activate other branches of the process P A . As t ∈ L(A) and A is deterministic, there exists a unique sequence of transitions leading to an accepting state q f ∈ Q f . For every such transition the attacker will activate the corresponding branch (1) in P A . If t = a 1 . . . a n , we define (tr, φ) as follows:
and φ is defined as expected given our semantics. Because of the definition of the branch (1), the inputs on the channels c a i are possible, the stack of the automaton upon reading a i and its current state being faithfully represented by the term w i φ. Thus, (tr, φ) is indeed a trace of P A . When reaching q f , the attacker can use the branch (2) and output the message senc(start, q f , r). As t ∈ L(B), the corresponding sequence of transitions in B does not lead to any accepting state: -either at some point of the execution of the automaton a transition from state q reading a is not possible with the current stack s. This means that there does not exist a suffix u of s such that (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ ), and thus, by definition of U q,a , there exists a suffix u of s such that u ∈ U q,a , enabling a transition (1a) on channel c a for the attacker, and every subsequent transition is done using branches (1b); -or the state reached in B after reading t is not an accepting state, that is, not in Q f : the sequence in(c f , w n+1 ).out(c f , w n+2 ) cannot occur in P B .
Consequently, there exists no trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P B ) (for any ψ), and thus P A P B .
(⇒) First, note that for every frame φ (ψ, respectively) such that (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P A ) ((tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P B ), respectively), we have that φ (ψ, respectively) is of the form
where the k i are nondeducible and the r i are "fresh" in the sense that they are all distinct and nondeducible. This means that no equality (but the trivial ones) holds in such a frame. Now consider the shortest trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P A ), in terms of number of transitions, such that there exists no equivalent frame (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P B ). Since keys are nondeducible, we may assume w.l.o.g that (tr, φ) ∈ trace fwd (P A ). Because of the branches (1), (1a), and (1b) and in particular the definition of U q,a , for any q ∈ Q and for any a ∈ , a transition of channel c a is always possible, and we have seen that the resulting frames are necessarily in static equivalence. Thus, only the shortest trace where P B will not be able to follow is when tr ends with an input/output on channel c f . Let w ∈ dom(φ) be the corresponding variable in the frame φ. Consider the subsequence seq tr (w) of tr and more precisely the sequence of channels that occurs in this subsequence. Such a sequence is of the form c 0 .c a 1 . . . c a n .c f .
Let v = a 1 . . . a n . We have that v is a word of * , and, in particular, -v ∈ L(A): indeed, branches (1) in P A faithfully represent transitions (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ) and a branch (2) can only be fired if q f ∈ Q f ; -v / ∈ L(B): indeed, branch (2) could not be fired, and either B cannot read v or, after reading v, B is not in any state of Q f .
Hence, v ∈ L(A) L(B), proving that L(A) ⊆ L(B).
Therefore, checking for equivalence of protocols is as difficult as checking equivalence of real-time generalized pushdown deterministic automata.
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we detail our tool Cpp2dpa to convert protocols in C pp into GDPA, available online at http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/∼chretien/cpp2dpa.php.
This tool takes two protocols in C pp as input, turns them into GDPAs, and, through the tool lAlBlC [Henry and Sénizergues 2013] , outputs whether the two protocols were in equivalence, yielding a witness of nonequivalence in the negative case in the form of a sequence of channels leading to an attack. The tool focuses on the encoding as described in Section 5. In particular, we assume the prior steps of Section 4 were successfully applied to the pair of protocols; namely, the bijection α as in Lemma 4.12 was successfully guessed and the oracles of Section 4.2.2 correctly added.
The tool Cpp2dpa is written in Python 3. From pairs of protocols in C pp , it generates three pairs of normalized deterministic pushdown automatons, instead of directly two pairs of GPDAs (as described in Section 5). This was necessary to interface with lAlBlC and involves no loss of generality, as the former are more expressive than our GDPA. The normalization process still has the inconvenience, in order to preserve the determinacy of the result, to output automata that may duplicate actions. More specifically, when necessary, the channels appearing in the potential witness of nonequivalence may be doubled. This technical detail does not impair the ability for the combined tool to prove equivalence or find witnesses, nevertheless.
Encoding Pairs
Most protocols use pairs. While our formalism does not directly support pairs, we may encode a restricted kind of pairing, when there are only constants (such as identities) on the right. Formally, this amounts to encoding a pair t, a , where t is a term and a some constant, by an encryption senc(t, a, r) for some random seed r. Provided constants used in concatenation are disjoint from constants used as keys, this encoding does not introduce any confusion. Note that since encryption is randomized, this pairing operator also differs as it is randomized.
Biometric Passport
We are interested here in proving the unlinkability of the electronic passport protocol. A detailed specification of it can be found in Arapinis et al. [2010] . Here, we only consider the passport's role and forget about the reader. The first case we consider is the flawed version corresponding to the French implementation of the passport, in which an attack arises from the ability of the attacker to observe whether a MAC check succeeds or not. As our framework does not directly enable us to deal with pairs of messages with their MAC, we model it by a signature: the attacker is able to obtain the plaintext of it (which amounts to retrieving the first component of the real pair) but cannot forge it (the attacker is not a priori able to forge a valid MAC). The resulting process is defined as follows: sign(senc(x, n p , z 1 ), mac ok , z 2 ) ).newr . out(c 2 , sign(senc(senc(x, n p , r 1 ), k p , r 2 ), mac k m , r 3 )), (2b) where newr is a shortcut of new r 1 .new r 2 .new r 3 .new r 4 (and similarly for newr and newr ). The protocol is modeled through three rules. Branch (1) corresponds to a message from the current session, emitted by the reader. While the original protocol can check the authenticity of the MAC and the value of the nonce sent to the passport, our formalism requires us to separate this into two steps: branches (2a) and (2b). Branch (2a) checks the validity of the MAC: if it is valid, it sends a message signed with mac ok . On the other hand, branch (2b) checks the value of the nonce (i.e., n p ) and finally emits the last message of the protocol. To retrieve the attack, we introduce the message sent by the reader from a previous session with a new branch denoted (0):
Another protocol P B is obtained by replacing mac k m by mac k m in branches (1), (2a), and (2b). Our tool Cpp2dpa can automatically check that P A ≈ P B .
Another version P A is obtained by replacing branches (2a) and (2b) by the branch
The protocol P B is similarly defined, with mac k m instead of mac k m , in branch (2). This version models the safe implementation of the protocol, where the success or failure of the MAC check is invisible to the attacker. Our tool Cpp2dpa can automatically prove that P A ≈ P B .
Experiments
We have tested our tool Cpp2dpa on the running example as defined in Example 2.7 and Example 4.5, as well as on an encoding of the electronic passport protocol, described in Section 7.2 in two versions, unsafe and safe (see Arapinis et al. [2010] for more details). The experiments were conducted on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5650 @ 2.67GHz with 47 Go of RAM, using one core only. The first column corresponds to the cumuled time required to produce the different automata, the second one the time needed to convert the automata into grammars to be processed by lAlBlC, and the third one to the status of the equivalence (proof or witness of nonequivalence) and the cumuled time spent to prove the equivalence (when it is the case) or the execution time to find a witness of nonequivalence, when possible. There is nonequivalence as soon as one of our three pairs of automata are not in equivalence. Since we execute lAlBlC in parallel for each of these three pairs, the execution time corresponds to the first pair that is found to be not in equivalence. Converting the automata to grammars required an optimization of the built-in functionality in lAlBlC in order to reach reasonable execution times. Other protocols were considered, namely, variants of the Wide Mouthed Frog, DenningSacco, and Private Authentication protocols. Unfortunately, for these ones, although the generation of automata was quick, it was impossible to prove (non)equivalence in reasonable time with lAlBlC.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have shown a first decidability result for equivalence of (deterministic) ping-pong protocols for an unbounded number of sessions by reducing it to the equality of languages of deterministic, generalized, real-time pushdown automata (GPDA). We further showed that deciding equivalence of ping-pong protocols is actually at least as hard as deciding equality of languages of GPDA. Complexity-wise, the situation is slightly less clear. While the reduction from GPDA to ping-pong protocols is polynomial, the reduction from ping-pong protocols to GPDA requires an exponential blow-up. Indeed, to get rid of the attacker, we guess a correspondence between the keys of P and Q, and exponentially many such correspondences should be checked. In addition, the complexity of equivalence of various classes of pushdown automata is not very well known. It follows that the exact complexity of checking equivalence of protocols is unknown. The only upper bound is that equivalence is at most primitive recursive. This bound comes from the algorithm proposed by C. Stirling for equivalence of DPA [Stirling 2002 ]. The lower bound comes from the fact that real-time deterministic pushdown automata are at least NL-hard [Boehm and Goeller 2011] . Whether equivalence of DPA (or even realtime GPDA) is, for example, at least NP-hard is unknown. The complexity hierarchy known so far for equivalence of ping-pong protocols is displayed in Figure 6 Note that the complexity of GPDA and ping-pong protocols is actually quite close since the reduction from ping-pong protocols to GPDA is "just" exponential. Moreover, assume now that we consider only procedures that return a witness of nonequivalence (if any). Then the complexity classes of GPDA and ping-pong protocols should actually coincide. Indeed, assume that there is a procedure for checking equivalence of GPDA that ends in time f (n), where n is the size of the inputs, and that returns a witness when two automata are not in equivalence. This witness must be of size at most f (n). Then, given two ping-pong protocols P and Q, we would constructP andQ as defined in Lemma 4.12 step by step.
Instead of guessing the sets K and K , we would start from the emptysets K = K = ∅. IfP ≈Q, that is, if AP ≈ AQ, we consider a witness of nonequivalence. Either it is a witness of P ≈ Q (and we are done) or there must exist a key k that is deducible in P and a corresponding key k deducible with the same actions in Q. We start over with K = {k} and K = {k }.
This algorithm has at most n steps, and each step involves a call to the GPDA procedure (AP ≈ AQ) and involves replaying a witness of size f (n). This yields a procedure of complexity O( f (n)).
Our class of security protocols handles only randomized primitives, namely, symmetric/asymmetric encryptions and signatures. Our decidability result could be extended to handle deterministic primitives instead of the randomized one (the reverse encoding-from real-time GPDAs to processes with deterministic encryption-may not hold anymore). Due to the use of pushdown automata, extending our decidability result to protocols with pairing is not straightforward. A direction is to use pushdown automata for which stacks are terms.
While we consider an unbounded number of sessions, we consider a fixed number of agents in our examples. We could model an unbounded number of agents; however, since our class considers protocol rules with at most one variable, we could consider at most one agent per rule with no key nor nonces, which would be very restrictive. Another direction is to study whether we can soundly bound the number of agents.
Our tool Cpp2dpa in combination with lAlBlC yields the first implementation of a decidability procedure for equivalence of protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. However, the number of protocols covered so far is limited. A first reason is in the limitations of the class of ping-pong protocols. However, another reason is the (too long) time needed to check for equivalence. Our transformation from protocols to automata using Cpp2dpa remains reasonably fast. Most of the execution time comes from lAlBlC. Since this tool is still in its early stage of development, we may hope for significant improvement of lAlBlC's performance in the next years.
APPENDIXES

A. UNDECIDABILITY OF TRACE INCLUSION
The purpose of this section is to establish the following result. THEOREM 3.6. The following problem is undecidable:
Output. Whether P is trace included in Q, that is, P Q.
An instance of the PCP over the alphabet A is given by two sets of tiles
The problem consists of deciding whether there exists a nonempty sequence i 1 , . . . , i p over {1, . . . , n} such that u i 1 . . .
To prove the undecidability of trace inclusion in C pp , we show it is possible to encode the Post Correspondence Problem into an inclusion of two protocols of this class. Given a word, one protocol will be meant to unstack the first set of tiles, while the other will try as much as possible to unstack the second set of tiles. While an empty word is not "simultaneously" reached by the two processes, their traces appear to be equivalent. Conversely, if a solution to the Post Correspondence Problem does exist, it will lead the second process to react in a distinct way (by stopping its execution), breaking the trace inclusion property.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we define two (possibly empty) sets of words over A, namely,
, where |v i | denotes the length of the word v i .
Example A.1. Let A = {a, b} and consider the following pairs of tiles: (b, ), (b, a), and (a, ba). This instance of PCP admits a solution. Indeed, the nonempty sequence 13 leads to the word u 1 u 3 = v 1 v 3 = ba. We have W 1 = W 1 = ∅, W 2 = {b} and W 2 = { }, and lastly W 3 = {aa, ab, bb} and W 3 = {a, b, }.
Words in A
* will be represented through nested symmetric encryption with private keys representing their counterparts in A. For the sake of brevity, given a word u = α 1 . . . α p of A * , we denote by -u the term senc(. . . senc ( , α 1 , z 1 ) . . . , α p , z p ); and -x.u the term senc(. . . senc(x, α 1 , z 1 ) . . . , α p , z p ),
where z 1 , . . . , z p are variables of sort rand. Note that if u = , then u = , and x.u = x. Next, k i , k i with i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} are constants in 0 of sort SymKey, and for each α ∈ A, we denote also by α its counterpart in 0 (constants of sort SymKey). We denote by a constant in 0 of sort msg. These constants are initially unknown by the attacker, and actually it is quite easy to see that they will be never revealed. Lastly, c, c α , c i , c with α ∈ A and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are constant symbols of sort channel in Ch.
Let P U and P V be the following protocols:
where i ranges in {1, . . . , n} and α in A. The branch (start) is the only way to start an execution, and then branches (1) are used to build a word α 1 . . . α n (that could be a Post word in case we consider a positive instance of PCP). This word will be represented through the term senc(. . . senc ( , α 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , α n , r n ) up to the choice of randoms. Then, branches (2) and (3) are used to unstack the different tiles u 1 , . . . , u n . Note that the purpose of having two similar branches (but using different keys) for this task is to ensure that we will unstack at least one tile, and thus the sequence i 1 . . . i p of indices is not empty. Then, reaching the empty word when unstacking these tiles will allow us to perform input/output on channel c (branch (4)):
where i ranges in {1, . . . , n}, α and β in A, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, w in W i and w in W i . The protocol P V has the same structure as P U . However, it is more complex since we want P V to follow the execution of P U as soon as the execution does not correspond to a solution of the PCP problem. In particular, we do not want P V to block in case it is not able to unstack a tile v i . To achieve this, some additional branches are added (namely, (2 a) and (2 b), as well as (3 a) and (3 b)). Intuitively, those branches are triggered when (2 ) and (3 ) cannot be, and the resulting term is encrypted with a special key k 3 that will allow P V to mimic the remainder of the execution using branch (5 ). Now, regarding the branches on channel c , the idea is to allow P V to mimic the behavior of P U only when the trace tr does not correspond to a solution of the PCP. To achieve this, we allow P V to follow P U only when the term given in input on channel c is not a legal encoding of the empty word. Such a term will go through (4 a) or (4 b).
Note that, on both protocols, the terms that are outputted look like fresh random numbers due to fresh nonces occurring in every output and ignorance of the keys. In other words, the two frames resulting from the execution of, respectively, P U and P V always remain in static equivalence. Therefore, checking trace equivalence amounts to checking that any execution trace of P U is a trace of P V , and conversely. LEMMA A.2. The protocols P U and P V described previously are in C pp .
PROOF. The only nontrivial point is to ensure that condition (2) stated in Definition 3.1 is satisfied, that is, to ensure that pattern matching operated by inputs taking place on the same channel is exclusive. Regarding protocol P U , when two inputs occur on the same channel c i , we have that the outermost key is different. Regarding protocol P V , the result also holds thanks to the exclusivity of the pattern matching obtained through a careful definition of sets W i and W i . For instance, note that when v i = , W i = W i = ∅, and thus there is no branch (2 a)/(2 b) ((3 a)/(3 b), respectively).
PROPOSITION A.3. Let U/V be an instance of PCP. We have that P U P V if and only if U/V is a negative instance of PCP (i.e., an instance with no solution).
PROOF. We prove successively the two implications. 
Let u = α 1 . . . . .α m be the resulting word over A. From this word and the sequence i 1 , . . . , i p , the attacker playing with P u can build the term senc(u, k 0 , r) representing the word u with branches (1) and then remove one by one the tiles u i p to u i 1 using (2) and (3). Let tr be the resulting trace of the protocol P U :
The trace tr models the fact that, given senc(u, k 0 , r) (stored in w m+1 ), P U can remove one by one the tiles u i p to u i 1 to reach the empty word and hence output the message senc( , k 1 , r) (stored in w m+ p+1 ) that can then be accepted as input on c . In this execution, no equality holds in the resulting frame φ, as the attacker ignores the keys that are used to encrypt, and all outputted messages use different random seeds; thus, all messages look fresh.
We claim that this trace does exist in P V ; that is, there exists no ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P V ). Indeed, the pattern matching operated by P V is exclusive once the term and the channel are fixed. Thus, P V has no choice but to remove tiles v i p to v i 1 using (2 ) and (3 ) leading to the term senc( , k 1 , r) (stored in w m+ p+1 ) as α 1 . . . α m is a Post word. Any other trace would lead to either a mismatch on the channels or an improper filtering in P V . Then the action in(c , w m+ p+1 ) will have no counterpart on P V . So (tr, φ) has no equivalent trace in P V , that is, P U P V . (⇐) If U/V is a negative instance of PCP, then P U P V . Let (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P U ); we aim at showing that there exists an equivalent trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P V ). Actually, since terms that are outputted by P U and P V look like fresh random numbers, we simply have to show that there exists ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P V ). Two cases can occur for any trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P U ):
-tr contains no input on channel c . In such a case, by construction of P V , the frame ψ can be built by following the sequence of channels used in tr and choosing the adequate filtering. It is always possible to do so, as the definition of sets W i and W i ensure that every term built by the attacker can be handled on any channel c i . Note that when the term given in input is of the form senc( , k 3 , r) for some r, it would be accepted on any channel. -tr contains an input on channel c . In such a case, this means that the associated term senc(α 1 . . . α m , k 0 , r) that has been built using channels c α with α ∈ A is a word made of tiles in {u 1 , . . . , u n }. Indeed, the only way to activate an input on c is to go through the branches (2) and (3) by unstacking the said tiles. Then, because this particular instance of PC P has no solution, such a word α 1 . . . α m cannot be a Post word and thus it cannot be decomposed using tiles in {v 1 , . . . , v n } following the same sequence of indices: because the filtering in P V is also exhaustive, messages outputted by P V from a certain point will be either encrypted by k 3 or will reach the end of the sequence with a term of the form senc(u, k 1 , r) with u different from the constant . Thanks to branches (4 a), (4 b), and (5 ), P V will be able to follow P U .
Hence, for any trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P U ), there exists a trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(P V ). It remains to show that φ ∼ ψ. This is due to the fact that both φ and ψ are of the form {w 1 senc(m 1 , k 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , w n senc(m n , k n , r n )}, where the k i are nondeducible and the r i are "fresh" in the sense that they are all distinct and nondeducible. We therefore conclude that P U P V .
Theorem 3.6 directly follows from Proposition A.3 and the undecidability of the Post Correspondence Problem.
B. GETTING RID OF THE ATTACKER
LEMMA B.1. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp and K P (K Q , respectively) be the set of deducible constants of sort key that occur in P (Q, respectively); if P ≈ Q, then there exists a unique bijection α from K P to K Q such that for every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P), there exists a trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that for any recipe R and any k ∈ K P : and conversely, for every (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) satisfying the same properties.
PROOF. We can describe α as a relation in the following way:
for every k ∈ K P of sort s, and every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) and recipe R such that Rφ↓ = k, we define α(k) = Rψ↓, where ψ is the only frame such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q).
The existence of such a frame comes from the fact that P ≈ Q, whereas its unicity is a consequence of the determinism of protocols in C pp . We now need to prove that our definition of α is sound and unambiguous. To do so, we show that -Rψ↓ is a constant of sort s. We have that there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) such that Rφ↓ = k ∈ K P . Since P ≈ Q and Q is in C pp , we consider the trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). By definition of static equivalence, we have that Rψ↓ is a constant of sort s. Otherwise, we would have that senc(start, R, r i )φ ∈ T ( , N ), whereas senc(start, R, r i )ψ ∈ T ( , N ) if s = SymKey (the resulting term is not properly sorted). The same argument applies with aenc and sign for s equal to PubKey and PrivKey, respectively. -We have that |K P | = |K Q |. Suppose ad absurdum that, for instance, |K P | < |K Q |.
Since every element of K Q is deducible (and due to the shape of the protocols under study), there exists (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that for all k ∈ K Q , there exists a recipe R k such that R k ψ↓ = k. In particular, when k = k , we have that R k ψ↓ = R k ψ↓. Since P ≈ Q, there exists a frame φ such that (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P). Thanks to the previous item, we know that R k φ↓ (R k φ↓, respectively) has the same sort as R k ψ↓ (R k ψ↓, respectively), that is, sort key. As |K P | < |K Q |, there exist two distinct keys k and k such that R k φ↓ = R k φ↓. Hence, φ and ψ are not statically equivalent, contradicting the fact that P ≈ Q. The case where |K Q | < |K P | can be handled similarly. -α is a function. Suppose there exist a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P), a recipe R i , and a corresponding equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that R i φ↓ = k and R i ψ↓ = k ; and a trace (tr , φ ) ∈ trace(P), a recipe R j , and a corresponding equivalence trace (tr , ψ ) ∈ trace(Q) such that R j φ ↓ = k but R j ψ ↓ = k with k = k . Considering the trace made up of the trace tr followed by tr , it is then possible to exhibit a witness of nonequivalence. More precisely, relying on R i and R j , we can build a test that holds in the resulting frame when executing P, whereas this test will not hold on the frame resulting from the execution of Q.
Now we show that α is an injection, that is, α(k) = α(k ) as soon as k, k are two distinct elements of K P . Suppose, as previously, there exist a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P), a recipe R i , and a corresponding equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that R i φ↓ = k and R i ψ↓ = α(k); and a trace (tr , φ ) ∈ trace(P), a recipe R j , and a corresponding equivalence trace (tr , ψ ) ∈ trace(Q) such that R j φ ↓ = k but R j ψ ↓ = α(k) with k = k . Considering the trace made up of the trace tr followed by tr , it is then possible to exhibit a witness of nonequivalence. More precisely, relying on R i and R j , we can build a test that holds in the frame resulting from the execution of P and that does not hold when executing Q. Thus, we have now proven that α is a bijection.
Note that we have already proved that: Rφ↓ = k if and only if Rψ↓ = α(k).
To show that α satisfies the last condition (item 3), suppose that k ∈ K P , and Rφ↓ = k −1 . As previously shown, Rψ↓ = α(k −1 ). We want to prove that α(k
If k is of sort SymKey, the result is obvious as k −1 = k for any such key. Suppose k is of sort PubKey. We have now that there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) and a recipe R such that R φ↓ = k ∈ K P . Since P ≈ Q, consider the corresponding equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). Consider the recipes R 1 = aenc(start, R , n) and R 2 = adec(R 1 , R). Then R 2 φ↓ = start and R 2 ψ↓ = start if and only if Rψ↓ = (R ψ) −1 . As we have already proved that α preserves sorts, we get that R 2 ψ↓ is of sort msg if and only if α(k
Hence, α is compatible with the inverse function. The same argument can be used if k is of sort PrivKey with sign and check.
Finally, we prove the unicity of such a bijection: suppose there were α an adequate bijection and k ∈ K P such that α(k) = α (k). By definition of α, for every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P) and every recipe R such that Rφ↓ = k, α(k) = Rψ↓. But as α satisfies a similar property, we get that Rψ↓ = α (k), contradicting our hypothesis. Hence, α is unique. Determinism of P and Q then ensures that traces of P and Q are uniquely matched (as P ≈ Q), thus guaranteeing the converse part of the Lemma. LEMMA B.2. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp respectively disclosing two sets of keys K and K as in Lemma 4.12 . Then P ≈ Q if and only ifP ≈ fwdQ , whereP andQ are as defined in Lemma 4.14. We call T oracle the transformation taking a pair of protocols (P, Q) satisfying the aforementioned condition and returning the pair (P,Q) presently defined.
PROOF. Let K P (K Q , respectively) be the set of deducible constants of sort key that occur in P (Q, respectively). We recall that, as a consequence of Lemma 4.12, we necessarily have that K P ⊆ K and K Q ⊆ K . Because protocols P andP (Q andQ, respectively) disclose all their deducible keys, there exists a trace (tr 0 , φ 0 ) of P andP ((tr 0 , ψ 0 ) a trace of Q andQ, respectively) defined as follows:
. . , k n ∈ K P , and φ 0 = {w 0 1 k 1 , . . . w 0 n k n }, and symmetrically for Q andQ. In the following, we will assume that a trace of P orP (of Q orQ, respectively) starts with the prefix tr 0 and contains the frame φ 0 .
For sake of clarity of the construction explained later, we actually show that P ≈ fwdQ if, and only if P + ≈ Q + ,
where c, x) .out(c, x) for some fresh channel name c. Then, it is easy to conclude the expected result relying on the fact that P ≈ Q is equivalent to P + ≈ Q + . (⇒) First, supposeP ≈ fwdQ . Assume that there exists (tr, φ) ∈ trace fwd (P) such that there is no equivalent frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace fwd (Q). We define (tr , φ) ∈ trace(P + ) as follows:
-every sequence in(c Note that by definition of a trace being in trace fwd (P), we have that R is either a variable w or the constant start. We claim that there exists no frame ψ such that (tr , ψ) ∈ trace(Q + ) with φ ∼ ψ. Indeed, because the frames are left unchanged, the input recipes match the same input patterns, and recipes holding true and false keep their truth values. So if such a frame ψ existed, (tr, ψ) would belong to trace fwd (Q) and be equivalent to (tr, φ) .
(⇐) Now, suppose P ≈ Q. We have that P + ≈ Q + , and we can even assume that P + ≈ io * Q + . We consider a witness of this nonequivalence, that is, a trace tr such that (tr, φ) ∈ trace io * (P + ) and for which there exists no equivalent frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace io * (Q + ). Actually, we can even assume w.l.o.g. that -every input recipe in tr on a channel different from c is either a variable w or the constant start; -every input recipe in tr on channel c involves at most one function symbol in pub ; and -φ ∼ fwd ψ, that is, we consider recipes that are either variables or the constant start.
We consider the shortest trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace io * (P), in terms of number of transitions, such that there is no equivalent frame ψ satisfying (tr, ψ) ∈ trace io * (Q), and for which all the requirements listed previously are satisfied.
Through recipes of the form senc(u, v, w) on channel c, the attacker has the ability to use the same random seed more than once. Let us first show that we can always assume tr uses nonces at most once. If this is not the case, we build a new trace (tr,φ), such that φ is statically equivalent toφ for which it is the case.
First, we consider the case where there exists no ψ such that (tr, ψ) / ∈ trace io * (Q). Because random seeds are not filtered in protocols of C pp (every input pattern contains distinct variables as third argument), we can rename some occurrences of the random seeds of the attacker (i.e., the random seeds appearing in the recipes on channel c) by fresh random seeds without changing the status of the trace (i.e., the fact that the trace is executable or not). Given tr ρ , such a trace obtained by renaming, we have that (tr ρ , φ ρ ) ∈ trace io * (P) for some frame φ ρ whereas (tr ρ , ψ ρ ) / ∈ trace io * (Q) for any frame ψ ρ . And in particular, if we choose tr ρ such that there are no two identical nonces in its image, we get a witness of nonequivalence with pairwise distinct random seeds for the attacker.
Now we consider the case where (tr, ψ) ∈ trace io * (Q) but φ ∼ fwd ψ. Suppose r is a random seed that appears twice in tr in two contexts f(w i , w j , r) and f(w i , w j , r) for some f ∈ pub with w i φ = w i φ and w j φ = w j φ. Because tr is a minimal witness of nonequivalence, φ −1 ∼ fwd ψ −1 , where φ −1 (ψ −1 , respectively) denotes φ (ψ, respectively) minus its last element. Consequently, we also have that w i ψ = w i ψ and w j ψ = w j ψ, as w i , w j , w i , w j ∈ dom(φ −1 ) (they are used in input recipes). Let w and w be the corresponding outputs of the recipes f(w i , w j , r) and f(w i , w j , r) and assume w appears before w in tr: we now have that w = w in both φ and ψ, and we can safely replace any occurrence of w in tr by w. The resulting trace is still a witness of nonequivalence as the substitution replaces identical terms in ψ.
Thus, it remains only to consider the case where a random seed appears twice in tr but such that either the function symbol, the plaintext, or the keys are different. Formally, consider the two contexts f(w i , w j , r) and g(w i , w j , r) with f, g ∈ pub , w and w their respective output variables as before, and either w i φ = w i φ, w j φ = w j φ, or f = g. Following the same reasoning as before, as φ −1 ∼ fwd ψ −1 , the same inequality has to hold in ψ. Consider the test w k = w k , which distinguishes between φ and ψ:
Replacing r by r in g(w i , w j , r) will still lead to w k ψ = w k ψ (after replacement) as no equality between subterms is added. But if w k φ = w k φ (after replacement), it would imply that there were two subterms that became different and were identical before; however, because the first step already took care of recipes introducing the same random seed twice in the same context, and the protocols in C pp cannot use a random seed from an input to use it in another encryption, it is impossible.
Hence, we showed that modifying tr intotr is a symmetric operation that preserves equalities in the two protocols: identical plaintexts and keys in (tr, φ) correspond to identical plaintexts and keys in (tr, ψ), whereas adding fresh nonces does not create any equality inφ orψ. If (tr, φ) does not have any equivalent trace in Q, (tr,φ) does not either. If there exists no frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), then there will exist no frameψ such that (tr,ψ) ∈ trace(Q) as input filtering is not affected by our transformation. Otherwise, if there exists ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) but φ and ψ are not statically equivalent, because our transformation preserves the terms in the frame, any pair of recipes that distinguishes between the two of them will distinguish φ andψ. So we can always assume than the random seeds occurring in the recipes f (u, v, w) in (tr, φ) are distinct.
Let us now define a corresponding trace (tr,φ) ∈ trace fwd (P):
. Note that each recipe R and R k is a variable w or the constant start. The corresponding frameφ is then defined according to our semantics. Since we have assumed that the random seeds occurring in the recipes in tr are distinct, we have thatφ = φ.
Finally, because (tr, φ) ∈ trace io * (P) has no equivalent in Q, and the definition of (tr,φ) does not alter the filtering on inputs or equalities between terms in the frame, (tr,φ) ∈ trace fwd (P) has no equivalent inQ.
C. ENCODING A PROTOCOL INTO A REAL-TIME GPDA
C.1. Characterization of Trace Equivalence
LEMMA C.1. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp ; if P ≈ fwd Q, then for every trace (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) and every w, w ∈ dom(σ P ), if wσ P = w σ P = c for some constant c, then wσ Q = w σ Q = c for some constant c , where σ Q is the frame such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace(Q).
PROOF. First, note that the frame σ Q mentioned in the lemma is unique up to some alpha-renaming of the randoms that occur in σ P . Thus, the choice of the frame σ Q does not change anything regarding the result that we want to prove.
Actually, the only nontrivial point to prove is that if wσ P = c, then wσ Q is necessarily a constant too. Since protocols in C pp have a replication for every branch, consider the trace obtained by "playing twice" the trace tr in P and Q; that is, given (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) with
build (tr , σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), where:
where every occurrence of start in tr is kept intr but occurrences of w k are replaced by w |σ P |+k , |σ P | being the cardinal of dom(σ P ); and tr.tr denotes the concatenation of the two sequences of labels, which is a valid trace, that is, (tr , σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P). We get symmetrically (tr , σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q). In particular, there exists w * ∈ dom(σ P ) with l < * such that wσ P = w * σ P = c and the test w = w * is disjoint; that is, seq tr (w) and seq tr (w * ) share no common prefix. As P ≈ fwd Q, necessarily wσ Q = w * σ Q . Now, because the test is disjoint, wσ Q and w * σ Q could not share any random nonces. Hence, wσ Q is a constant. LEMMA C.2. Let P and Q be two protocols in C pp such that P ≈ fwd Q. For every trace (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), every w, w ∈ dom(σ P ) such that the test w = w is σ P -valid, σ Pguarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ P ), we have that w = w is σ Q -valid, σ Q -guarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ Q ), where σ Q is the frame such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q).
The only nontrivial point to prove is that if the test w = w is σ P -valid, σ P -guarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ P ), then it is also σ Q -guarded and pulled up in (tr, σ Q ). Note that it is necessarily σ Q -valid since P ≈ fwd Q. Actually, we can still assume that the test w = w is σ Q -guarded (it would otherwise contradict Lemma C.1).
Let pref = io(c i 0 , start, w j 0 ) . . . io(c i p , w j p−1 , w j p ) be the maximal common prefix of seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). Now, it remains to show that w = w is pulled up in (tr, σ Q ); that is, wσ Q does not occur as a subterm in
Assume that this is not the case; we will show that there exists a trace (tr
is the frame such that (tr * , σ * P ) ∈ trace fwd (P). Note that such a frame necessarily exists since otherwise it trivially contradicts our hypothesis.
Let p ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} be the smallest index such that wσ Q occurs as a subterm in w j p σ Q . We have that From these sequences, we can define (tr * , σ * Q ) with tr * = tr.tr. Intuitively, the tracetr is obtained relying on the sequence of channels as indicated in the sequence s 2 .s 3 using systematically the last generated recipe to feed the following input, and w j p to start. More precisely, assuming that
we have that
and σ * Q defined as expected relying on our semantics. Let w * = w and w * = w |σ P |+ . We can now show the following:
(1) The test w * = w * is σ * Q -valid and σ * Q -guarded. Indeed, by definition of tr * , w * σ * Q and w σ Q are already equal up to a renaming of random seeds, as the channel components of seq tr (w ) and seq tr * (w * ) match. As w * σ * Q = wσ Q = w σ Q , w * σ * Q and w * σ * Q are equal up to a renaming of their random seeds. Lastly, we have that w * σ * Q and w * σ * Q are both subterms of w j p σ * Q , and hence w * σ *
. This is by construction of tr * .
Finally, as P ≈ fwd Q, there exists σ * P such that (tr * , σ * P ) ∈ trace fwd (P). But now w * = w * is σ * Q -valid, σ * Q -guarded, and pulled up in (tr * , σ * Q ). Moreover, we are now in a situation where the top-level random seeds of w * σ * P and w * σ * P are generated outside the common prefix of seq tr * (w * ) and seq tr * (w * ), and thus this implies that w * σ * P = w * σ * P , contradicting the equivalence P ≈ fwd Q. -CONST P : For all (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), there exists a frame σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q) and for every w, w ∈ dom(σ P ) and for every constant c ∈ 0 ∪ {start}, wσ P = w σ Q = c if and only if there exists a constant c ∈ 0 ∪ {start} such that wσ Q = w σ Q = c . -CONST Q : Similarly swapping the roles of P and Q. -GUARDED P : For all (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P), there exists a frame σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q) and every test that is σ P -valid, σ P -guarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ P ) is also σ Q -valid, σ Q -guarded, and pulled up in (tr, σ Q ). -GUARDED Q : Similarly swapping the roles of P and Q.
PROOF. We prove the two directions separately. (⇒) This implication is a direct consequence of Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2. (⇐) Suppose that P ≈ fwd Q. This means that there exists for instance (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) such that either there exists no frame σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q), in which case conditions CONST P and GUARDED P fail, or σ Q is indeed defined and there exists a test w = w such that wσ P = w σ P but wσ Q = w σ Q (or the converse). Let us assume that wσ P = w σ P but wσ Q = w σ Q .
If wσ P = w σ P = c for some constant c, then condition CONST P is false. Otherwise, we have that the test w = w is σ P -valid and σ P -guarded. From tr and w = w , we will build a new trace (tr * , σ * P ) and a new test w * = w * that is σ * P -valid, σ * P -guarded, and also pulled up in (tr * , σ * P ). Actually, we proceed as in the proof of the previous lemma.
Let pref = io(c i 0 , start, w j 0 ) . . . io(c i p , w j p−1 , w j p ) be the maximal common prefix of seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). Let p ∈ {0, . . . , p − 1} be the smallest index such that wσ P occurs as a subterm in w j p σ P . Note that if this index does not exist, then the test w = w is already pulled up in (tr, σ P ) and we are done.
We have that pref = s 1 .io(c i p , w j p −1 , w j p ).s 2 and seq tr (w) = pref.s 3 seq tr (w ) = pref.s 3 for some sequence s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , and s 3 . From these sequences, we can define (tr * , σ * P ) with tr * = tr,tr. Intuitively, the tracetr is obtained relying on the sequence of channels as indicated in the sequence s 2 .s 3 using systematically the last-generated recipe to feed the following input, and w j p to start. More precisely, assuming that seq tr (w ) = s 1 .io(c i p , w j p −1 , w j p ).io(c k 1 , w j p , w l 1 ).io(c k 2 , w l 1 , w l 2 ) . . . io(c k , w l −1 , w l ), we have that tr = io(c k 1 , w j p , w |σ P |+1 ).io(c k 2 , w |σ P |+1 , w |σ P |+2 ) . . . io(c k , w |σ P |+l−1 , w |σ P |+ ) and σ * P defined as expected relying on our semantics. Let w * = w and w * = w |σ P |+ . Now, either there exists no frame σ * Q such that (tr * , σ * Q ) ∈ trace(Q), in which case condition GUARDED P fails obviously, or such a frame exists. In this case, by construction of tr * , we have that the test w * = w * is σ * P -valid, σ * P -guarded, and pulled up in (tr * , σ * P ). In order to conclude, it remains to show that w * σ * Q = w * σ * Q . We already know that wσ Q = w * σ * Q . Suppose ad absurdum that w * σ * Q = w * σ * Q . Because the sequences of channels that occur in seq tr (w ) and seq tr * (w * ) are the same, w σ Q and w * σ * Q are either constant and equal or of the form f(u, k, r) with f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign} and equal up to a renaming of their random seeds. In the first case, it is enough to conclude that wσ Q = w σ Q , which is absurd. In the second case, w * σ * Q and w * σ * Q , being randomized, must have equal top-level random seeds, implying that this nonce was introduced before io(c i p , w j p −1 , w j p ) in the common prefix of their respective sequences. As the said prefix is also common to w and w in tr, wσ Q and w σ Q share the same top-level random seed and are thus equal, contradicting our hypothesis. Therefore: w * σ * Q = w * σ * Q . Hence, GUARDED P is false.
Finally, if wσ Q = w σ Q but wσ P = w σ P , conditions CONST Q and GUARDED Q will similarly fail. with σ P the substitution defined uniquely as expected from our semantics. We have that (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) as the transition function δ fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in C pp . Since u ∈ L(A Q CONST ), we have that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q) for any substitution σ Q , and thus the condition CONST P fails.
C.2. From Trace Equivalence to
Case u is accepted in q f : In such a case, we also build a trace (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) "corresponding" to u. The construction is a bit more involved. We have that u is of the form c i 1 c i 2 . . . c i k c test c j 1 c j 2 . . . c j l c end . Let tr = tr 1 .tr 2 , with tr 1 and tr 2 defined as follows:
-tr 1 = io(c i 1 , start, w 1 ).io(c i 2 , w 1 , w 2 ) . . . io(c i k , w k−1 , w k ); -tr 2 = io(c j 1 , start, w k+1 ).io(c j 2 , w k+1 , w k+2 ) . . . io(c j l , w k+l−1 , w k+l ); and σ P is defined uniquely as expected from our semantics, as P is deterministic. We have that (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) as the transition function δ fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in C pp . We can now define w = w k and w = w k+l . Because the transitions from q 0 to q c and then from q c to q f for some constant c were possible, we get that wσ P = w σ P = c.
We know that u = u 1 c test u 2 c end / ∈ L(A Q CONST ), and we may assume that u 1 and u 2 are both in L(A Q CONST ). Indeed, otherwise, this means that there exists no substitution σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q), and thus CONST P fails, and the result holds. From now on, we assume that there exists σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q). (1) Case q = q 0 and q = q c for some constant c. In such a case, wσ Q = c for any constant c, and wσ Q is thus a guarded term. The condition CONST P fails.
(2) Case q = q c and q = q f for some constant c. In such a case, wσ Q = c but wσ = c, making CONST P fail once again.
Hence, P and Q do not satisfy CONST P . Symmetrically, if u ∈ L(A Q CONST ) L(A P CONST ), the condition CONST Q will fail.
(⇐) Assume that P and Q do not satisfy CONST P (or CONST Q ), that is, there exists a trace (tr, σ P ) ∈ trace fwd (P) such that:
(1) either there exists no σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q); (2) or there exist w, w ∈ dom(σ P ) and a constant c such that wσ P = w σ P = c but either wσ Q is not a constant or wσ Q is a constant but wσ Q = w σ Q .
We consider such a trace of minimal length . In the first case, thanks to minimality, we have that seq tr (w ) = tr. From tr, we build a word u ∈ L(A P CONST ) by extracting the channels that occur in tr, keeping the order. Since there does not exist σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q), and the transition function δ of the automaton fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in C pp , we have that u ∈ L(A Q CONST ). In the second case, thanks to minimality, we have that tr is actually made up of all the actions that occur in seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ) (note that these two sequences may share some actions). From tr, we built a word u = u 1 c test u 2 c end ∈ L(A P CONST ) as follows: -u 1 is obtained by extracting the channels that occur in seq tr (w) preserving the order; and -u 2 is obtained by extracting the channels that occur in seq tr (w ) preserving the order.
As the transition function δ fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in C pp , we get that upon reading c test , A -either w = w is not σ Q -valid, -or w = w is not σ Q -guarded, -or w = w is not pulled-up in (tr, σ Q ).
We consider such a trace of minimal length . In the first case, thanks to the minimality, we have that seq tr (w ) = tr. From tr, we build a word u ∈ L(A P GUARDED ) by extracting the channels that occur in tr, keeping the order. Since there does not exist σ Q such that (tr, σ Q ) ∈ trace fwd (Q), and the transition function δ of the automaton fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in C pp , we have that u ∈ L(A Q GUARDED ). In the second case, thanks to minimality, we have that tr is actually made up of all the actions that occur in seq tr (w) and seq tr (w ). These two sequences have a maximal common prefix pref that is not empty. Actually, we have that pref = io(c i 1 , start, w 1 ).io(c i 2 , w 1 , w 2 ) . . . io(c i p , w p−1 , w p ) for some p ≥ 1. As the transition function δ fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in C pp , and since w = w is a test that is σ P -guarded, σ P -valid, and pulled up in (tr, σ P ), we get that u ∈ L(A
